The Iranian nuclear crisis, a major challenge for regional security as well as global efforts to limit nuclear proliferation, began in August 2002 with the revelation of the ongoing construction of two covert Iranian facilities: the Natanz uranium enrichment plant and the plutonium-production reactor in Arak. Three European countries—France, Great Britain, and Germany—initially attempted to manage this problem. In 2006, the United States, Russia, and China joined them in a two-pronged strategy of dialogue and pressure through sanctions. This grouping of countries came to be known as the E3+3, or known as the P6 or P5+1 in the United States (for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany). Their strategy led to repeated efforts to undertake negotiations with Iran, which were unproductive due to Iran’s reservations concerning the first agreements reached (in May 2005) and its failure to demonstrate any genuine will to negotiate in the following years.
At the same time, Iran continued to increase its capacity, both declared (at Natanz, after it had been discovered in 2002) and undisclosed (at Fordow, a uranium enrichment facility discovered in 2009), while limiting cooperation with the International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAEA). The United Nations applied ever-more stringent sanctions, as did the European Union and the United States unilaterally. In May 2012, just after the French presidential elections and as I became Foreign Minister, the Iranian nuclear question was at a diplomatic impasse—the array of sanctions in place and the disquieting state of advancement of the Iranian nuclear program justified the fear of military intervention to shut it down.
Given the high stakes that this issue represented for national and regional security as well as for nuclear nonproliferation, we decided, in full agreement with the President of the French Republic, to engage in a policy of “constructive firmness.” Our objective? To negotiate and conclude an agreement that would be solid and verifiable, and that would show real progress and create confidence in the international community toward Iran’s genuine renunciation of nuclear weapons.
Many things have been written and said about how this major agreement came into being, some true, others less so. This is why I believe that, without waiting for the archival materials to be made public, a precise, straightforward description of the complex discussions as expressed by one of the participants—in this case, myself—would be of use. It is in this spirit that I wrote the following, which serves as a kind of first-hand account of events, and ends with some lessons learned.
Discussions on the Iranian nuclear program began again in the spring of 2012, after an interruption since January 2011 without face-to-face meetings but marked by “epistolary diplomacy” between the EU’s High Representative, Cathy Ashton, and the Iranian negotiator and secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Tehran. Negotiators were able to return to the table because Iran had abandoned a certain number of preconditions: the right to enrichment and the immediate lifting of sanctions. It soon brought these conditions back to the table, however, and the discussions became pointless.
Nevertheless, this temporary opening on the Iranian side did enable a series of consultations to take place among policy chiefs of the E3+3 and Iran at several different times: Istanbul in April 2012, Baghdad in May (which led to the expression “the Baghdad offer”), and Moscow in June. Experts also held their own meetings, such as at Istanbul in July. Iran did not really engage with the debate on the basic E3+3 proposals, which addressed the main concern of Iran enriching uranium to 20 percent, making it highly-enriched uranium that is used for weapons. Indeed since the end of 2011, Iran had accelerated the construction of cascades at the Fordow site, and had begun enriching uranium to 20 percent.
The E3+3 group did advance concrete proposals for cooperation and agreed not to adopt new resolutions on the nuclear program at the UN Security Council. The Iranians refused to respond to the expectations of the three key demands on enrichment: an end to the production of uranium enriched to 20 percent, closure of the Fordow enrichment site, and removal from Iran of the stockpile of uranium that had already been enriched to 20 percent. However, the question of supplying fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which had been the subject of former proposals in the years 2009–2010, was no longer mentioned.
The Iranians in fact only proposed to gradually suspend the enrichment of uranium to 20 percent in the context of a nine-stage plan leading to lifting all sanctions, multilateral and unilateral. This plan, even the existence of which was later challenged by the Iranian negotiator, had in fact been brought forward during a follow-up meeting between Ashton’s deputy, Helga Schmid, and Jalili’s lead associate, Ali Bagheri, on July 24, 2012, in Istanbul.
It rapidly appeared in the summer of 2012 that the Iranians had a much reduced margin of maneuver for negotiation, given that the regime seemed to be awaiting the results of the November 2012 U.S. presidential elections before making a decision. Concerns further mounted that negotiations would be frozen even longer while the United States would in turn await the results of the June 2013 Iranian presidential elections.
Tensions grew in the summer and fall 2012. The European Union began preparations for a new series of financial and energy sanctions (confirmed on October 15). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a spectacular intervention at the UN General Assembly at the end of September, waving a drawing of a bomb and literally laying down Israel’s line in the sand: Iranian possession of enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to make a nuclear device could not be allowed.
The tenor of the negotiations changed over several months, as the objective refocused to prevent an Israeli strike rather than on solving the basic problem of Iranian nuclear capacity. The fear of military intervention once again raised the question, so often asked since the beginning of the crisis in 2002: have we tried everything to find a diplomatic resolution to this crisis?
A ministerial meeting of the E3+3 group was scheduled in New York for September 27, 2012. The Russian minister, Sergey Lavrov, cancelled at the last minute; officially, he was ill, but there is reason to believe that he did not appreciate the E3 ministers’ September 2012 letter to the other Foreign Ministers of the EU Foreign Affairs Council calling for new European Union sanctions on Iran.
The E3+3 ministers agreed in New York to study the possible parameters for a revised “Baghdad offer.” This U.S. idea, which held sway at the State Department and in think tanks, was “more for more”: ask more from Iran, but offer more in terms of lifting sanctions. U.S. authorities initially saw this offer to be substantial, but it was watered down progressively as the November U.S. presidential elections approached. Once the elections were over, the United States confirmed what had become an unambitious plan.
An initial meeting of E3+3 experts was held in London on October 10 to start discussing the possible revised parameters of an offer. At that time, a significant divergence of opinion emerged between Russia and China, on the one hand, and the rest of the E3+3 on the other, as the two powers reckoned that pretty much all sanctions should be put in the balance to make for a very attractive offer. E3+3 policy directors met in Brussels on November 21, with their experts, in order to move forward. Previously, during a November 15 videoconference among the E3+3, the Americans had presented the outline of their proposal to revise the Baghdad offer. It merely updated the three demands concerning 20 percent enrichment. It also included, in addition to the offers in the May 2012 Baghdad package, a temporary suspension of certain sanctions (gold and precious metals, export to Iran of petrochemical products) as well as a commitment from the EU (but not the United States, at that stage) not to adopt new sanctions following those of October 15.
The Russians refused to consider any further demands placed on Iran. Not only that, they suggested that the group withdraw some of its demands and offer the Iranians more. The Russians and Chinese worked together on a new proposal, also submitted on November 15. This draft sought the suspension of 20 percent uranium enrichment in Iran (without dismantling Fordow or removing the stockpile), along with a few verification measures, in exchange for recognition by the E3+3 group of Iran’s right to enrich uranium and the suspension of the European oil embargo.
France then began to study the idea of a “roadmap” that we could bring to our partners, and which would meet Iran’s demands to “go beyond the 1st phase” of confidence-building measures in regard to 20 percent enrichment. We estimated it would take a matter of days, a maximum of two weeks, to put together a reasonable “roadmap,” given that all the elements had long been worked on at our end.
On December 6 in Berlin, the E3+3 finally approved the update of the offer made to Iran in Baghdad in May 2012. They agreed on a “political chapeau,” first suggested by the British, which placed this revised offer in the context of a possible extension beyond the first phase of confidence-building measures. The British and Germans were disappointed by the wait-and-see attitude of the Americans. A clear change in approach took place as of the summer of 2012 in London (related to a change in their policy chief, from Mark Sedwill to Simon Gass, and the Iran task force chief, who was now Ajay Sharma): the Foreign Office, and likely the British Prime Minister’s office, explicitly wished to set possible oil sanction relief and maintenance of uranium enrichment in Iran at the top of the negotiations list. Sanctions relief on oil had so far not been envisaged as a top-tier measure. Berlin, with a long-standing position in favor of the right to enrichment, leapt into the British breach and also called for drafting a more attractive offer. But the Americans refused to enter the debate on what would be an acceptable state for the Iranian nuclear program, and the issue was left to stand temporarily. The Russians and Chinese did not press the issue, and seemed satisfied with the prospect of renewed contacts with Iran.
The first half of 2013 was marked by a new series of meetings held in Kazakhstan: the E3+3 met the Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, in Almaty on February 26 and 27, then again on April 5 and 6. Despite exchanges that were, for the first time, quite substantial, the group in Almaty found a sizable gap between the Iranian position and their own. Iran was only prepared to discuss very limited measures. These would result in a status quo for the nuclear program, while the demand for recognition of Iran’s right to enrich and for lifting the most important sanctions remained. In these circumstances, it did not seem possible to plan a new meeting. Negotiators agreed on a “time out” until after the June 2013 Iranian elections.
The election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran
in June 2013 opened the way to renew negotiations. His victory over the nuclear negotiator himself, Saeed Jalili, and the fact that the issue of sanctions relief had dominated the election campaign was a sign that Iranian diplomacy might be changing track. It was difficult to identify the Iranians’ real objective: would they really accept an agreement with a strong framework (meaning verification and restrictive measures on sensitive aspects of the nuclear and missile program), an agreement that would require significant concessions?
We reminded our partners of the period when Rouhani was in charge of nuclear negotiations (2003–2005). It is true that during that period Western diplomacy achieved some partial successes: the Tehran agreement of October 2003 on suspension of uranium enrichment; the Paris agreement in November 2004 on a second suspension; a global negotiation process involving the E3/EU and Iran. But it was also a period marked by Iran’s duplicity and failure to truly keep their commitments. President Rouhani’s memoirs touch on the Iranian approach to releasing information on the covert program, and they are eloquent: dissimulation, wasting time to avoid being brought before the UN Security Council, leading the Europeans along, a policy of fait accompli, research on enrichment proficiency.11. Hassan Rouhani, National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy (Tehran: Center for Strategic Research (2011).View all notes
President Rouhani very quickly asserted that the nuclear crisis could be solved in three to six months. As president, he chose a Minister of Foreign Affairs who was well known to the E3+3: Javad Zarif, former Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, very knowledgeable about the United States and Western diplomatic codes. The Iranian minister, a pleasant man with a perpetual smile, gave an energetic presentation in perfect English of Iran’s “new approach.” It was an attempt to override the petitio principii of the previous team and focus on negotiating the final state of the Iranian nuclear program. The idea was to come to mutual approval of enrichment means within a year, in exchange for relief from all sanctions. There was, however, a reiteration of arguments (like sanctions are illegal and Iran’s rights must be recognized), no more discussion of any kind of commitment to suspend particular activities (the 20 percent question was to be “addressed” during negotiations), and the Iranian minister made no mention of the Arak reactor.
I mention in passing that it is difficult to carry out fruitful negotiations when the starting point is the declaration that UNSC resolutions are “illegal.” Furthermore, developments on the ground must not contradict the basis of negotiation; yet, for example, construction on the Arak facility continued (and indeed was of increasing concern to international observers, who feared a repeat of the Israeli “Operation Opera” strike which destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear plant in 1981).
Nevertheless, the E3+3 ministers welcomed the new tone of the new Iranian leadership overall, while underscoring the need to review each item and the precise terms of the Iranian proposal. When the E3+3 ministers held their first meeting with Javad Zarif, I began to outline two key points of the French position: because Iran had stated that it was not seeking to develop nuclear weapons, it had to accept the consequences of that policy; the E3+3 would then, in exchange, be willing to accept Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear power capacity.
In early October, it became clear that negotiations outside the framework of the E3+3 group would be dangerous. We began to work on the broad outlines of the regulation of the Iranian program, covering materials (production, existing capacity, stockpiles), militarization and, ideally, ballistic capacities (even though we were aware from the outset that it was unlikely that we would obtain genuine guarantees). More precisely, we were at that time seeking to stop the enrichment of uranium to 20 percent; a suspension of R&D activities; the closure of the Fordow site; the conversion of the Arak plutonium production reactor into a light-water reactor; abandonment of the heavy-water plant (which is used to enrich uranium) co-located with the reactor; removal of stockpiles at 3.5 percent from Iran (with potential for recovery in future years, if Iran were to develop nuclear power plants); and the application of the highest standards of verification (using the Additional Protocol, Code 3.1, of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)).
On October 15 and 16, the policy chiefs of the E3+3, with EU High Representative Cathy Ashton, met Zarif and his deputy minister, Abbas Araghchi, in Geneva. The Iranian minister (suffering from back pain) gave a PowerPoint presentation of his ideas, with the objective titled “Closing an unnecessary crisis: Opening new horizons.” These ideas included:
a “common objective”: ensuring that Iran’s exercise of its right to nuclear power, including enrichment, would remain entirely peaceful—sanction relief being a prerequisite;
a final step using the Supreme Leader’s fatwa (a religious ruling) against Iran building or possessing nuclear weapons, but allowing R&D and enrichment at Natanz and Fordow according to mutually accepted terms, operation of the Arak reactor under “proliferation-resistant” conditions, cooperation on civilian nuclear applications with transparency and international monitoring by the IAEA, along with relief from all sanctions;
a first phase, which would include addressing: production and stockpiles of 20-percent enriched uranium; the level of activities at Natanz and Fordow; increased IAEA monitoring; purchase, transport, insurance and repatriation of Iranian oil revenues; financial transactions; and national restrictions on petrochemical products, automobiles, gold, and other precious metals.
Zarif did not mention the unresolved issues of the Iranian nuclear weapons program; he simply planned on having Iran sign an agreement with the IAEA. He emphasized that there would be no roll-back of the Iranian program.
Behind these big ideas, it nonetheless became apparent during a second, more detailed session with Iranian Deputy Minister Araghchi alone that there were still significant differences with Iran. Araghchi made a distinction between technology, which Iran would continue to develop, and the production of enriched uranium, which was recognized as the heart of our concern. Any gesture made by Iran would be in reciprocity for gestures made by the P5+1, but the first phase could include the complete suspension of enrichment to 20 percent, the conversion or dilution of the 20-percent stockpile, a plan to convert the Arak facility (which was not a high stake for Iran because the start-up had already been postponed), and further measures on transparency (but not the Additional Protocol, because of measures passed by the Iranian parliament).22. See for instance declarations by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the Majlis, Alaedin Boroudjerdi: “Regarding the Additional Protocol, Majlis has approved a law obliging the government to suspend the voluntary implementation of this protocol which was being carried out at a certain point,” quoted in “Majlis not to accept Additional Protocol,” PressTV, September 30, 2013, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/326921.html.View all notes
An entire session was devoted to sanctions. The E3+3 reaffirmed their position on the first phase: suspension of sanctions on petrochemical products, gold and precious metals, civil aviation products, and a commitment from the UNSC and EU not to adopt new sanctions. Iran reaffirmed it sought the full suspension of sanctions in the first phase.
The discussions in Geneva were carried out in a more constructive and fluid atmosphere than previous encounters, confirming that Iran had modified its approach to negotiations. But still, the Iranian positions remained imprecise and rather far from our own. Our group held a united front, although the British, once again, opened up many new pathways on their own. The Americans seemed to remain very cautious, reiterating basic parameters.
Negotiations continued in Geneva on November 7, 2013. The E3+3 experts came together without Iran to specify the first-phase parameters would last six months. In reality, this work, which went on late into the night, was only a façade: the main U.S. experts were absent, replaced by a second-string team. In the midst of the discussions, U.S. policy chief Wendy Sherman handed her counterparts a very different kind of document, secret and not fully finalized, that integrated the three elements demanded by Iran in October’s Zarif Plan: a common objectives or preamble, a first phase, and a last phase. On the evening of November 7, it gave rise to a tense exchange between the French policy chief and the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Bill Burns, with regard to a perceived betrayal
of confidence: the Americans had not informed us of the content or even existence of these discussions.
Nevertheless, this was the proposal that served as a basis for E3+3 ministerial-level discussions over the next two days. Because of its shortcomings, it seemed unacceptable to me. The U.S. document did not provide an explicit commitment by Iran not to develop or obtain nuclear weapons; did not address the question of enrichment over the long term (which Iran sought to make unconditional); did not include a satisfactory plan for handling the stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent (Iran demanded that, in the first six-month period, allowances be made for needs linked to future research reactors); did not limit production of centrifuges
to those needed to replace broken ones; and did not suspend all activities associated with the construction of the Arak reactor and the manufacture or testing of its fuel. As soon as I arrived, at the end of the morning of November 8, I gave my counterparts, and in particular U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, our demands for shoring up the five major points of the text that we felt necessary.
At the same time, the Americans saw that Iranians were backpedalling on certain points that they believed had been agreed upon in Oman. The British and German ministers stayed on the sidelines, ready to accept any results that satisfied both the Americans and the Iranians. As of that moment, negotiations essentially moved forward between three ministers—American, French, and Iranian.
On Saturday November 9, I went on the radio station France Inter to explain our demands. Tensions mounted. The U.S. delegation was annoyed, while the British and Germans encouraged us to be more flexible, meaning to withdraw our demands.
At the end of the morning, I met with Secretary Kerry, who was impatient to push ahead. No concessions were made. I expressed my disagreement with both the method and substance of the proposal: France would not accept a watered-down agreement. After a very tense debate, we finally reached an agreement on a revised proposal addressing the five problematic points. We made our proposal to the rest of the group when the Chinese deputy minister arrived that afternoon. Kerry, who admitted the merits of our positions, advocated for the French demands. After discussion, our partners endorsed the text. Sergey Lavrov, a habitually loquacious diplomat whose contributions bore mostly on procedure, sharply criticized the process as it had occurred—he was unhappy both with the backchannel and with what he saw as a hasty and unprofessional way to conduct negotiations in Geneva. But the P5+1 nevertheless approved a text to be submitted to Javad Zarif at the end of the afternoon.
That evening, Zarif saw that the group’s position was substantively unanimous. He had thought that the whole group would have accepted the secret agreement with the Americans, so he expressed—or feigned—surprise at the slightly revised text. At the end of a long exchange of ideas, it appeared that Iran was not ready to accept the text as presented. Zarif delivered a vehement tirade against the “changes” in the agreement that had supposedly been reached in Oman with the Americans. He even hinted at a complete end to negotiations. Ashton and the P5+1 ministers suggested that a new meeting of policy chiefs should be scheduled to resolve the outstanding issues, and it was set for November 20.
In the meantime, Iran fine-tuned its “narrative” about the alleged transparency of its program and signed an agreement on November 11 with the IAEA in Tehran: a “Framework for Cooperation” that gave the impression that the possible military dimensions of the Iranian program would finally be seriously addressed. For my part, I had a deep and sincere conversation with John Kerry between November 9 and 20 on the form and substance of the negotiations, to ensure that the backchannel “process” used by the Americans in Oman would not be repeated.
Experts began negotiations on implementation on December 9 in Vienna; the first meeting went on until the 13th. While progress was made, it quickly became apparent that the Geneva Agreement contained many ambiguities that would affect implementation. In addition, Iran made a sudden declaration of the existence and production of a new, advanced-generation centrifuge (later it became the IR-8, but at that time it did not yet have a name) before interrupting the discussions on the pretext of a U.S. announcement that individual Iranian companies linked to nuclear proliferation would be subject to sanctions.
Discussions resumed from December 19–22 in Geneva before halting again, this time because of the announcement that the new, advanced IR-8 centrifuge would be installed at the Natanz pilot facility. The P5+1 were unanimous in their rejection of this development, saying it was unacceptable and contrary to the spirit and the letter of the agreement; the dispute rose up to the policy level. Substantial divergences remained on other nuclear topics (such as the link between the schedule for dilution of 20-percent-enriched uranium and the schedule for releasing frozen oil revenues, the precise definition of measures associated with the Arak heavy water reactor, and R&D issues). Discussions of sanctions relief were more constructive. The Iranians didn’t bother to take a “good faith” attitude in negotiating the document. In fact, the “nucleocrats” seemed to take a harder line with diplomats, with Iranian atomic energy authorities trying to save what they could from Zarif’s concessions.
A new session was held after Christmas, until the wee hours of December 31. The Americans moved ahead slowly on the “slices,” or monthly payments to be made to the Iranians—releasing the $4.2 billion all at once was out of the question, for fear of Iran “cashing in” and then not delivering on the nuclear measures.
The problem of the new centrifuge was still not resolved. It would be settled in early January after new discussions between Helga Schmid, Abbas Araghchi, and the IAEA yielded a “gentlemen’s agreement,” supposed to be secret. The centrifuge could remain in place, on the condition that it was not connected to a uranium supply. The agreement could go into effect on January 20, using a “longest day” schedule whereby—thanks to the time difference between Tehran, Vienna, Brussels, and Washington—Iran’s nuclear actions and the suspension of sanctions could take place successively, but on the same day.
At the same time, Iran continued to increase its capacity, both declared (at Natanz, after it had been discovered in 2002) and undisclosed (at Fordow, a uranium enrichment facility discovered in 2009), while limiting cooperation with the International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAEA). The United Nations applied ever-more stringent sanctions, as did the European Union and the United States unilaterally. In May 2012, just after the French presidential elections and as I became Foreign Minister, the Iranian nuclear question was at a diplomatic impasse—the array of sanctions in place and the disquieting state of advancement of the Iranian nuclear program justified the fear of military intervention to shut it down.
Given the high stakes that this issue represented for national and regional security as well as for nuclear nonproliferation, we decided, in full agreement with the President of the French Republic, to engage in a policy of “constructive firmness.” Our objective? To negotiate and conclude an agreement that would be solid and verifiable, and that would show real progress and create confidence in the international community toward Iran’s genuine renunciation of nuclear weapons.
Many things have been written and said about how this major agreement came into being, some true, others less so. This is why I believe that, without waiting for the archival materials to be made public, a precise, straightforward description of the complex discussions as expressed by one of the participants—in this case, myself—would be of use. It is in this spirit that I wrote the following, which serves as a kind of first-hand account of events, and ends with some lessons learned.
Discussions on the Iranian nuclear program began again in the spring of 2012, after an interruption since January 2011 without face-to-face meetings but marked by “epistolary diplomacy” between the EU’s High Representative, Cathy Ashton, and the Iranian negotiator and secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Tehran. Negotiators were able to return to the table because Iran had abandoned a certain number of preconditions: the right to enrichment and the immediate lifting of sanctions. It soon brought these conditions back to the table, however, and the discussions became pointless.
Nevertheless, this temporary opening on the Iranian side did enable a series of consultations to take place among policy chiefs of the E3+3 and Iran at several different times: Istanbul in April 2012, Baghdad in May (which led to the expression “the Baghdad offer”), and Moscow in June. Experts also held their own meetings, such as at Istanbul in July. Iran did not really engage with the debate on the basic E3+3 proposals, which addressed the main concern of Iran enriching uranium to 20 percent, making it highly-enriched uranium that is used for weapons. Indeed since the end of 2011, Iran had accelerated the construction of cascades at the Fordow site, and had begun enriching uranium to 20 percent.
The E3+3 group did advance concrete proposals for cooperation and agreed not to adopt new resolutions on the nuclear program at the UN Security Council. The Iranians refused to respond to the expectations of the three key demands on enrichment: an end to the production of uranium enriched to 20 percent, closure of the Fordow enrichment site, and removal from Iran of the stockpile of uranium that had already been enriched to 20 percent. However, the question of supplying fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which had been the subject of former proposals in the years 2009–2010, was no longer mentioned.
The Iranians in fact only proposed to gradually suspend the enrichment of uranium to 20 percent in the context of a nine-stage plan leading to lifting all sanctions, multilateral and unilateral. This plan, even the existence of which was later challenged by the Iranian negotiator, had in fact been brought forward during a follow-up meeting between Ashton’s deputy, Helga Schmid, and Jalili’s lead associate, Ali Bagheri, on July 24, 2012, in Istanbul.
It rapidly appeared in the summer of 2012 that the Iranians had a much reduced margin of maneuver for negotiation, given that the regime seemed to be awaiting the results of the November 2012 U.S. presidential elections before making a decision. Concerns further mounted that negotiations would be frozen even longer while the United States would in turn await the results of the June 2013 Iranian presidential elections.
Tensions grew in the summer and fall 2012. The European Union began preparations for a new series of financial and energy sanctions (confirmed on October 15). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a spectacular intervention at the UN General Assembly at the end of September, waving a drawing of a bomb and literally laying down Israel’s line in the sand: Iranian possession of enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to make a nuclear device could not be allowed.
The tenor of the negotiations changed over several months, as the objective refocused to prevent an Israeli strike rather than on solving the basic problem of Iranian nuclear capacity. The fear of military intervention once again raised the question, so often asked since the beginning of the crisis in 2002: have we tried everything to find a diplomatic resolution to this crisis?
A ministerial meeting of the E3+3 group was scheduled in New York for September 27, 2012. The Russian minister, Sergey Lavrov, cancelled at the last minute; officially, he was ill, but there is reason to believe that he did not appreciate the E3 ministers’ September 2012 letter to the other Foreign Ministers of the EU Foreign Affairs Council calling for new European Union sanctions on Iran.
The E3+3 ministers agreed in New York to study the possible parameters for a revised “Baghdad offer.” This U.S. idea, which held sway at the State Department and in think tanks, was “more for more”: ask more from Iran, but offer more in terms of lifting sanctions. U.S. authorities initially saw this offer to be substantial, but it was watered down progressively as the November U.S. presidential elections approached. Once the elections were over, the United States confirmed what had become an unambitious plan.
An initial meeting of E3+3 experts was held in London on October 10 to start discussing the possible revised parameters of an offer. At that time, a significant divergence of opinion emerged between Russia and China, on the one hand, and the rest of the E3+3 on the other, as the two powers reckoned that pretty much all sanctions should be put in the balance to make for a very attractive offer. E3+3 policy directors met in Brussels on November 21, with their experts, in order to move forward. Previously, during a November 15 videoconference among the E3+3, the Americans had presented the outline of their proposal to revise the Baghdad offer. It merely updated the three demands concerning 20 percent enrichment. It also included, in addition to the offers in the May 2012 Baghdad package, a temporary suspension of certain sanctions (gold and precious metals, export to Iran of petrochemical products) as well as a commitment from the EU (but not the United States, at that stage) not to adopt new sanctions following those of October 15.
The Russians refused to consider any further demands placed on Iran. Not only that, they suggested that the group withdraw some of its demands and offer the Iranians more. The Russians and Chinese worked together on a new proposal, also submitted on November 15. This draft sought the suspension of 20 percent uranium enrichment in Iran (without dismantling Fordow or removing the stockpile), along with a few verification measures, in exchange for recognition by the E3+3 group of Iran’s right to enrich uranium and the suspension of the European oil embargo.
France then began to study the idea of a “roadmap” that we could bring to our partners, and which would meet Iran’s demands to “go beyond the 1st phase” of confidence-building measures in regard to 20 percent enrichment. We estimated it would take a matter of days, a maximum of two weeks, to put together a reasonable “roadmap,” given that all the elements had long been worked on at our end.
On December 6 in Berlin, the E3+3 finally approved the update of the offer made to Iran in Baghdad in May 2012. They agreed on a “political chapeau,” first suggested by the British, which placed this revised offer in the context of a possible extension beyond the first phase of confidence-building measures. The British and Germans were disappointed by the wait-and-see attitude of the Americans. A clear change in approach took place as of the summer of 2012 in London (related to a change in their policy chief, from Mark Sedwill to Simon Gass, and the Iran task force chief, who was now Ajay Sharma): the Foreign Office, and likely the British Prime Minister’s office, explicitly wished to set possible oil sanction relief and maintenance of uranium enrichment in Iran at the top of the negotiations list. Sanctions relief on oil had so far not been envisaged as a top-tier measure. Berlin, with a long-standing position in favor of the right to enrichment, leapt into the British breach and also called for drafting a more attractive offer. But the Americans refused to enter the debate on what would be an acceptable state for the Iranian nuclear program, and the issue was left to stand temporarily. The Russians and Chinese did not press the issue, and seemed satisfied with the prospect of renewed contacts with Iran.
The first half of 2013 was marked by a new series of meetings held in Kazakhstan: the E3+3 met the Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, in Almaty on February 26 and 27, then again on April 5 and 6. Despite exchanges that were, for the first time, quite substantial, the group in Almaty found a sizable gap between the Iranian position and their own. Iran was only prepared to discuss very limited measures. These would result in a status quo for the nuclear program, while the demand for recognition of Iran’s right to enrich and for lifting the most important sanctions remained. In these circumstances, it did not seem possible to plan a new meeting. Negotiators agreed on a “time out” until after the June 2013 Iranian elections.
The election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran
in June 2013 opened the way to renew negotiations. His victory over the nuclear negotiator himself, Saeed Jalili, and the fact that the issue of sanctions relief had dominated the election campaign was a sign that Iranian diplomacy might be changing track. It was difficult to identify the Iranians’ real objective: would they really accept an agreement with a strong framework (meaning verification and restrictive measures on sensitive aspects of the nuclear and missile program), an agreement that would require significant concessions?
We reminded our partners of the period when Rouhani was in charge of nuclear negotiations (2003–2005). It is true that during that period Western diplomacy achieved some partial successes: the Tehran agreement of October 2003 on suspension of uranium enrichment; the Paris agreement in November 2004 on a second suspension; a global negotiation process involving the E3/EU and Iran. But it was also a period marked by Iran’s duplicity and failure to truly keep their commitments. President Rouhani’s memoirs touch on the Iranian approach to releasing information on the covert program, and they are eloquent: dissimulation, wasting time to avoid being brought before the UN Security Council, leading the Europeans along, a policy of fait accompli, research on enrichment proficiency.11. Hassan Rouhani, National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy (Tehran: Center for Strategic Research (2011).View all notes
President Rouhani very quickly asserted that the nuclear crisis could be solved in three to six months. As president, he chose a Minister of Foreign Affairs who was well known to the E3+3: Javad Zarif, former Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, very knowledgeable about the United States and Western diplomatic codes. The Iranian minister, a pleasant man with a perpetual smile, gave an energetic presentation in perfect English of Iran’s “new approach.” It was an attempt to override the petitio principii of the previous team and focus on negotiating the final state of the Iranian nuclear program. The idea was to come to mutual approval of enrichment means within a year, in exchange for relief from all sanctions. There was, however, a reiteration of arguments (like sanctions are illegal and Iran’s rights must be recognized), no more discussion of any kind of commitment to suspend particular activities (the 20 percent question was to be “addressed” during negotiations), and the Iranian minister made no mention of the Arak reactor.
I mention in passing that it is difficult to carry out fruitful negotiations when the starting point is the declaration that UNSC resolutions are “illegal.” Furthermore, developments on the ground must not contradict the basis of negotiation; yet, for example, construction on the Arak facility continued (and indeed was of increasing concern to international observers, who feared a repeat of the Israeli “Operation Opera” strike which destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear plant in 1981).
Nevertheless, the E3+3 ministers welcomed the new tone of the new Iranian leadership overall, while underscoring the need to review each item and the precise terms of the Iranian proposal. When the E3+3 ministers held their first meeting with Javad Zarif, I began to outline two key points of the French position: because Iran had stated that it was not seeking to develop nuclear weapons, it had to accept the consequences of that policy; the E3+3 would then, in exchange, be willing to accept Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear power capacity.
In early October, it became clear that negotiations outside the framework of the E3+3 group would be dangerous. We began to work on the broad outlines of the regulation of the Iranian program, covering materials (production, existing capacity, stockpiles), militarization and, ideally, ballistic capacities (even though we were aware from the outset that it was unlikely that we would obtain genuine guarantees). More precisely, we were at that time seeking to stop the enrichment of uranium to 20 percent; a suspension of R&D activities; the closure of the Fordow site; the conversion of the Arak plutonium production reactor into a light-water reactor; abandonment of the heavy-water plant (which is used to enrich uranium) co-located with the reactor; removal of stockpiles at 3.5 percent from Iran (with potential for recovery in future years, if Iran were to develop nuclear power plants); and the application of the highest standards of verification (using the Additional Protocol, Code 3.1, of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)).
On October 15 and 16, the policy chiefs of the E3+3, with EU High Representative Cathy Ashton, met Zarif and his deputy minister, Abbas Araghchi, in Geneva. The Iranian minister (suffering from back pain) gave a PowerPoint presentation of his ideas, with the objective titled “Closing an unnecessary crisis: Opening new horizons.” These ideas included:
a “common objective”: ensuring that Iran’s exercise of its right to nuclear power, including enrichment, would remain entirely peaceful—sanction relief being a prerequisite;
a final step using the Supreme Leader’s fatwa (a religious ruling) against Iran building or possessing nuclear weapons, but allowing R&D and enrichment at Natanz and Fordow according to mutually accepted terms, operation of the Arak reactor under “proliferation-resistant” conditions, cooperation on civilian nuclear applications with transparency and international monitoring by the IAEA, along with relief from all sanctions;
a first phase, which would include addressing: production and stockpiles of 20-percent enriched uranium; the level of activities at Natanz and Fordow; increased IAEA monitoring; purchase, transport, insurance and repatriation of Iranian oil revenues; financial transactions; and national restrictions on petrochemical products, automobiles, gold, and other precious metals.
Zarif did not mention the unresolved issues of the Iranian nuclear weapons program; he simply planned on having Iran sign an agreement with the IAEA. He emphasized that there would be no roll-back of the Iranian program.
Behind these big ideas, it nonetheless became apparent during a second, more detailed session with Iranian Deputy Minister Araghchi alone that there were still significant differences with Iran. Araghchi made a distinction between technology, which Iran would continue to develop, and the production of enriched uranium, which was recognized as the heart of our concern. Any gesture made by Iran would be in reciprocity for gestures made by the P5+1, but the first phase could include the complete suspension of enrichment to 20 percent, the conversion or dilution of the 20-percent stockpile, a plan to convert the Arak facility (which was not a high stake for Iran because the start-up had already been postponed), and further measures on transparency (but not the Additional Protocol, because of measures passed by the Iranian parliament).22. See for instance declarations by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the Majlis, Alaedin Boroudjerdi: “Regarding the Additional Protocol, Majlis has approved a law obliging the government to suspend the voluntary implementation of this protocol which was being carried out at a certain point,” quoted in “Majlis not to accept Additional Protocol,” PressTV, September 30, 2013, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/326921.html.View all notes
An entire session was devoted to sanctions. The E3+3 reaffirmed their position on the first phase: suspension of sanctions on petrochemical products, gold and precious metals, civil aviation products, and a commitment from the UNSC and EU not to adopt new sanctions. Iran reaffirmed it sought the full suspension of sanctions in the first phase.
The discussions in Geneva were carried out in a more constructive and fluid atmosphere than previous encounters, confirming that Iran had modified its approach to negotiations. But still, the Iranian positions remained imprecise and rather far from our own. Our group held a united front, although the British, once again, opened up many new pathways on their own. The Americans seemed to remain very cautious, reiterating basic parameters.
Negotiations continued in Geneva on November 7, 2013. The E3+3 experts came together without Iran to specify the first-phase parameters would last six months. In reality, this work, which went on late into the night, was only a façade: the main U.S. experts were absent, replaced by a second-string team. In the midst of the discussions, U.S. policy chief Wendy Sherman handed her counterparts a very different kind of document, secret and not fully finalized, that integrated the three elements demanded by Iran in October’s Zarif Plan: a common objectives or preamble, a first phase, and a last phase. On the evening of November 7, it gave rise to a tense exchange between the French policy chief and the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Bill Burns, with regard to a perceived betrayal
of confidence: the Americans had not informed us of the content or even existence of these discussions.
Nevertheless, this was the proposal that served as a basis for E3+3 ministerial-level discussions over the next two days. Because of its shortcomings, it seemed unacceptable to me. The U.S. document did not provide an explicit commitment by Iran not to develop or obtain nuclear weapons; did not address the question of enrichment over the long term (which Iran sought to make unconditional); did not include a satisfactory plan for handling the stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent (Iran demanded that, in the first six-month period, allowances be made for needs linked to future research reactors); did not limit production of centrifuges
to those needed to replace broken ones; and did not suspend all activities associated with the construction of the Arak reactor and the manufacture or testing of its fuel. As soon as I arrived, at the end of the morning of November 8, I gave my counterparts, and in particular U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, our demands for shoring up the five major points of the text that we felt necessary.
At the same time, the Americans saw that Iranians were backpedalling on certain points that they believed had been agreed upon in Oman. The British and German ministers stayed on the sidelines, ready to accept any results that satisfied both the Americans and the Iranians. As of that moment, negotiations essentially moved forward between three ministers—American, French, and Iranian.
On Saturday November 9, I went on the radio station France Inter to explain our demands. Tensions mounted. The U.S. delegation was annoyed, while the British and Germans encouraged us to be more flexible, meaning to withdraw our demands.
At the end of the morning, I met with Secretary Kerry, who was impatient to push ahead. No concessions were made. I expressed my disagreement with both the method and substance of the proposal: France would not accept a watered-down agreement. After a very tense debate, we finally reached an agreement on a revised proposal addressing the five problematic points. We made our proposal to the rest of the group when the Chinese deputy minister arrived that afternoon. Kerry, who admitted the merits of our positions, advocated for the French demands. After discussion, our partners endorsed the text. Sergey Lavrov, a habitually loquacious diplomat whose contributions bore mostly on procedure, sharply criticized the process as it had occurred—he was unhappy both with the backchannel and with what he saw as a hasty and unprofessional way to conduct negotiations in Geneva. But the P5+1 nevertheless approved a text to be submitted to Javad Zarif at the end of the afternoon.
That evening, Zarif saw that the group’s position was substantively unanimous. He had thought that the whole group would have accepted the secret agreement with the Americans, so he expressed—or feigned—surprise at the slightly revised text. At the end of a long exchange of ideas, it appeared that Iran was not ready to accept the text as presented. Zarif delivered a vehement tirade against the “changes” in the agreement that had supposedly been reached in Oman with the Americans. He even hinted at a complete end to negotiations. Ashton and the P5+1 ministers suggested that a new meeting of policy chiefs should be scheduled to resolve the outstanding issues, and it was set for November 20.
In the meantime, Iran fine-tuned its “narrative” about the alleged transparency of its program and signed an agreement on November 11 with the IAEA in Tehran: a “Framework for Cooperation” that gave the impression that the possible military dimensions of the Iranian program would finally be seriously addressed. For my part, I had a deep and sincere conversation with John Kerry between November 9 and 20 on the form and substance of the negotiations, to ensure that the backchannel “process” used by the Americans in Oman would not be repeated.
Experts began negotiations on implementation on December 9 in Vienna; the first meeting went on until the 13th. While progress was made, it quickly became apparent that the Geneva Agreement contained many ambiguities that would affect implementation. In addition, Iran made a sudden declaration of the existence and production of a new, advanced-generation centrifuge (later it became the IR-8, but at that time it did not yet have a name) before interrupting the discussions on the pretext of a U.S. announcement that individual Iranian companies linked to nuclear proliferation would be subject to sanctions.
Discussions resumed from December 19–22 in Geneva before halting again, this time because of the announcement that the new, advanced IR-8 centrifuge would be installed at the Natanz pilot facility. The P5+1 were unanimous in their rejection of this development, saying it was unacceptable and contrary to the spirit and the letter of the agreement; the dispute rose up to the policy level. Substantial divergences remained on other nuclear topics (such as the link between the schedule for dilution of 20-percent-enriched uranium and the schedule for releasing frozen oil revenues, the precise definition of measures associated with the Arak heavy water reactor, and R&D issues). Discussions of sanctions relief were more constructive. The Iranians didn’t bother to take a “good faith” attitude in negotiating the document. In fact, the “nucleocrats” seemed to take a harder line with diplomats, with Iranian atomic energy authorities trying to save what they could from Zarif’s concessions.
A new session was held after Christmas, until the wee hours of December 31. The Americans moved ahead slowly on the “slices,” or monthly payments to be made to the Iranians—releasing the $4.2 billion all at once was out of the question, for fear of Iran “cashing in” and then not delivering on the nuclear measures.
The problem of the new centrifuge was still not resolved. It would be settled in early January after new discussions between Helga Schmid, Abbas Araghchi, and the IAEA yielded a “gentlemen’s agreement,” supposed to be secret. The centrifuge could remain in place, on the condition that it was not connected to a uranium supply. The agreement could go into effect on January 20, using a “longest day” schedule whereby—thanks to the time difference between Tehran, Vienna, Brussels, and Washington—Iran’s nuclear actions and the suspension of sanctions could take place successively, but on the same day.
