By Julio Burdman
Observatorio Electoral
Dancing with gov’t and opposition at once implies risks
Unlike the case of Buenos Aires province, where Governor María Eugenia Vidal is pursuing traditional coalition politics (with a UCR-Radical lieutenant governor and a legislative alliance with the Renewal Front that allowed Massa’s ally Jorge Sarghini to become speaker of the provincial Lower House), the governance formula of President Mauricio Macri is still uncertain. He decided not to build the textbook government coalition of inviting other political parties to join the presidential Cabinet in exchange for legislative support. Instead, he has preferred to manage almost by himself, with minor participation of his UCR and Civic Coalition electoral partners. Key ministers and government officials, plus the entire presidential line of succession (President Macri, Vice-President Gabriela Michetti, Senate Speaker Federico Pinedo and Lower House Speaker Emilio Monzó) belong to the same political party, PRO. And he has been using the emergency presidential powers to legislate, with executive decrees and without the Congress, on issues such as public security, borders, fiscal federalism, the Cabinet and criminal law.
This was the approach chosen by Macri, which is not necessarily the only available way. As political analyst María Esperanza Casullo pointed out, if Macri would have sought a law to declare the state of security emergency nationwide, he could have got it: the Renewal Front, most of the UCR leaders, many Peronists and public opinion would have supported it, and the new security law could have been a benchmark case for Let’s Change’s call for consensual governance during the campaign. Macri, however, has preferred to show that he is a strong and independent manager.
But Massa is not completely oblivious to Macri’s presidency. Unlike the Victory Front leaders, Massa has not raised his voice to criticize Macri’s policies yet. He only speaks about dialogue, responsiveness and common viewpoints, and eight members of his team have already been appointed by Macri or Vidal to government positions. The Renewal Front bloc and Emilio Monzó are getting along in the building of the Lower House. And the trip to Davos showed Massa, once more, like a kind of presidential ally, while Macri told the press he wished for the Renewal Front leader to become the new chairman of the Justicialist Party.
At the same time, Massa is trying to position itself as a leader who will reorganize the Peronist opposition. He coordinated the highly-publicized Pinamar’s barbecue with Juan Manuel Urtubey, Diego Bossio and other Peronist politicians seeking to distance themselves from Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. And a few days ago, Massa declared his hope that former Córdoba Governor José De la Sota, his former ally in the presidential campaign, will be the new chairman of the Peronist party.
In the recent history of Argentina, it is very difficult to find a precedent of a major political leader that has tried to dance simultaneously with the government and the opposition. The reasons seem obvious: in our presidential system the winner takes all, and therefore politicians have incentives to either become presidents, or behave as hardline opponents (to eventually reach the presidency). If Massa now fosters close ties with Macri, but does not take part in the national government, he will pay all the costs. He will be blamed for the failures of Macri and he won’t enjoy the benefits of being in power. We are not a parliamentary republic, but Massa seems to follow the strategy of a European centrist party, halfway between the ruling party and the opposition.
In our political culture, to grow while in the opposition one needs to be critical of the government and aggregate support among dissatisfied voters. Therefore, the risk of Massa is to end up in the famous “non-place,” where he is not in government and he is unable to grow as an opposition leader. Of course, Massa is smart and experienced enough to know all this. So, we can speculate on two reasons in order to understand the strange place Massa occupies. One is that he plans to become part of Macri’s government in a not-so-distant future, and he is preparing the way. In that case, Massa knows something that has not been made public. The other possibility is that Massa has a broad faith in his ability to change his political position once that is needed. That is, he is planning to shift towards hardline opposition in the future. In the second case, the problem for Massa will be of a different nature: if Macri moves boldly towards conservative reforms, the best way of becoming an opposition leader is through the left. And Macri is now leaving that side clearly neglected, with little possibility of return.
@julioburdman
Observatorio Electoral
Dancing with gov’t and opposition at once implies risks
Unlike the case of Buenos Aires province, where Governor María Eugenia Vidal is pursuing traditional coalition politics (with a UCR-Radical lieutenant governor and a legislative alliance with the Renewal Front that allowed Massa’s ally Jorge Sarghini to become speaker of the provincial Lower House), the governance formula of President Mauricio Macri is still uncertain. He decided not to build the textbook government coalition of inviting other political parties to join the presidential Cabinet in exchange for legislative support. Instead, he has preferred to manage almost by himself, with minor participation of his UCR and Civic Coalition electoral partners. Key ministers and government officials, plus the entire presidential line of succession (President Macri, Vice-President Gabriela Michetti, Senate Speaker Federico Pinedo and Lower House Speaker Emilio Monzó) belong to the same political party, PRO. And he has been using the emergency presidential powers to legislate, with executive decrees and without the Congress, on issues such as public security, borders, fiscal federalism, the Cabinet and criminal law.
This was the approach chosen by Macri, which is not necessarily the only available way. As political analyst María Esperanza Casullo pointed out, if Macri would have sought a law to declare the state of security emergency nationwide, he could have got it: the Renewal Front, most of the UCR leaders, many Peronists and public opinion would have supported it, and the new security law could have been a benchmark case for Let’s Change’s call for consensual governance during the campaign. Macri, however, has preferred to show that he is a strong and independent manager.
But Massa is not completely oblivious to Macri’s presidency. Unlike the Victory Front leaders, Massa has not raised his voice to criticize Macri’s policies yet. He only speaks about dialogue, responsiveness and common viewpoints, and eight members of his team have already been appointed by Macri or Vidal to government positions. The Renewal Front bloc and Emilio Monzó are getting along in the building of the Lower House. And the trip to Davos showed Massa, once more, like a kind of presidential ally, while Macri told the press he wished for the Renewal Front leader to become the new chairman of the Justicialist Party.
At the same time, Massa is trying to position itself as a leader who will reorganize the Peronist opposition. He coordinated the highly-publicized Pinamar’s barbecue with Juan Manuel Urtubey, Diego Bossio and other Peronist politicians seeking to distance themselves from Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. And a few days ago, Massa declared his hope that former Córdoba Governor José De la Sota, his former ally in the presidential campaign, will be the new chairman of the Peronist party.
In the recent history of Argentina, it is very difficult to find a precedent of a major political leader that has tried to dance simultaneously with the government and the opposition. The reasons seem obvious: in our presidential system the winner takes all, and therefore politicians have incentives to either become presidents, or behave as hardline opponents (to eventually reach the presidency). If Massa now fosters close ties with Macri, but does not take part in the national government, he will pay all the costs. He will be blamed for the failures of Macri and he won’t enjoy the benefits of being in power. We are not a parliamentary republic, but Massa seems to follow the strategy of a European centrist party, halfway between the ruling party and the opposition.
In our political culture, to grow while in the opposition one needs to be critical of the government and aggregate support among dissatisfied voters. Therefore, the risk of Massa is to end up in the famous “non-place,” where he is not in government and he is unable to grow as an opposition leader. Of course, Massa is smart and experienced enough to know all this. So, we can speculate on two reasons in order to understand the strange place Massa occupies. One is that he plans to become part of Macri’s government in a not-so-distant future, and he is preparing the way. In that case, Massa knows something that has not been made public. The other possibility is that Massa has a broad faith in his ability to change his political position once that is needed. That is, he is planning to shift towards hardline opposition in the future. In the second case, the problem for Massa will be of a different nature: if Macri moves boldly towards conservative reforms, the best way of becoming an opposition leader is through the left. And Macri is now leaving that side clearly neglected, with little possibility of return.
@julioburdman
